“I expect that this new edition will serve to guide epistemological practice for the next several years, and with at least as much authority as the first edition. If you want to contribute to the most important epistemological conversations today, you will need to read this book.”  

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Matthias Steup is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA, where he is head of the Department of Philosophy. A specialist in epistemology, he is a widely published author and editor. Previous work includes A Companion to Epistemology (co-edited with Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, second edition), the first edition of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (co-edited with Ernest Sosa, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), and Knowledge, Truth and Duty (2001).

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Praise for *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology 2e*

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– Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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“This book is packed with cutting-edge epistemology by excellent contributors to the field. It is both comprehensive and admirably brief.”

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Notes on Contributors

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Preface to the Second Edition

The second edition of Contemporary Debates in Epistemology contains opposing essays on five new topics: the analyzability of knowledge and how to do epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, the relation between knowledge and intellectually virtuous motives, the relation between knowledge and luck, and evidential slack. These essays can be found in Chapters 1, 4, 6, 7, and 12. The inclusion of these new chapters made it necessary to drop two debates from the first edition: one on conceptual content in perceptual experience, the other on epistemic responsibility. We have also added three new essays to the debate on immediate justification (Chapter 9) and two additional essays to the debate on justification and coherence (Chapter 10). Nine of the first edition’s topics have been retained, so the second edition contains debates on altogether 14 chapters.

Significantly updated and enlarged, we believe that the second edition will, even more so than the first, be essential and fascinating reading to fellow epistemologists, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates. We wish to thank the contributors for debating each other vigorously and with sophistication, Travis Gilmore for proofreading the manuscript, and Jeff Dean, Lindsay Bourgeois, and Jennifer Bray at Wiley-Blackwell for their invaluable assistance in putting this volume together.

Matthias Steup
John Turri
Ernest Sosa

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