Philosophy of Mind
## Contents

Preface ix

1 Mind–Body Theories and Mind–Body Problems 1
   Overview 1
   1.1 Mind and Brain 2
   1.2 Mind–Body Theories 5
   1.3 Mind–Body Problems 11
   1.4 The Problem of Psychophysical Emergence 13
   1.5 The Problem of Other Minds 17
   1.6 The Problem of Mental Causation 18
       Further Reading 21

2 The Mental-Physical Distinction 23
   Overview 23
   2.1 Mental versus Physical 23
   2.2 Physical Phenomena 24
   2.3 First-Person Authority and Subjectivity 26
   2.4 Qualia and Phenomenal Consciousness 28
   2.5 Intentionality, Mental Representation, and
       Propositional Attitudes 30
   2.6 Rationality 31
       Further Reading 32

3 Substance Dualism 34
   Overview 34
   3.1 Substance Dualism: Its Claims and Motivations 35
   3.2 The Argument For Substance Dualism 39
   3.3 Objections to the Argument for Substance Dualism 43
   3.4 Substance Dualism and the Problem of Other Minds 50
   3.5 The Problem of Interaction 55
   3.6 Noninteractionist Views: Parallelism and Occasionalism 59
   3.7 The Problem of Explanatory Impotence 62
   3.8 Substance Dualism in Perspective 65
       Further Reading 65
4 The Physicalist Worldview 68
   Overview 68
   4.1 What Physicalism Claims 69
   4.2 Varieties of Physicalism: Eliminative, Reductive, and Nonreductive 71
   4.3 Implications of Physicalist Theories 74
   4.4 Motivations For Physicalism 75
   4.5 The Argument For Physicalism: Past Scientific Success 77
   4.6 Hempel’s Dilemma 79
   4.7 The Knowledge Argument 83
   4.8 Absent and Inverted Qualia 86
   4.9 Representational, Higher-Order, and Sensorimotor Theories of Consciousness 89
   Further Reading 100

5 Reductive Physicalism 102
   Overview 102
   5.1 Behaviorism 103
   5.2 Arguments For and Against Behaviorism 106
   5.3 The Theory Model of Psychological Discourse 111
   5.4 The Psychophysical Identity Theory 112
   5.5 Smart’s Argument For the Identity Theory: Ockham’s Razor 115
   5.6 Lewis’s Argument For the Identity Theory 117
   5.7 Reductivism 120
   5.8 The Multilevel Worldview 124
   Further Reading 126

6 Nonreductive Physicalism 129
   Overview 129
   6.1 The Multiple-Realizability Argument 131
   6.2 Reductivist Responses to the Multiple-Realizability Argument 134
   6.3 Functionalism 136
   6.4 Higher-Order Properties 140
   6.5 Functionalism versus the Identity Theory 141
   6.6 Functionalism and the Nonreductivist Consensus: Realization Physicalism 144
   6.7 Troubles with Functionalism: Liberalism and Qualia 149
   6.8 The Chinese Room 156
   6.9 The Embodied Mind Objection to Functionalism 159
   6.10 Kim’s Trilemma 161
   6.11 Supervenience Physicalism 164
   6.12 The Exclusion Argument 169
   6.13 Nonreductive Physicalism in Perspective 176
   Further Reading 177
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Eliminative Physicalism, Instrumentalism, and Anomalous Monism</td>
<td>180-199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>The Argument For Eliminativism</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>The Argument Against Eliminativism</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Instrumentalism</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Arguments For and Against Instrumentalism</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Anomalous Monism</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>The Argument For Anomalous Monism</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>Arguments Against Anomalous Monism</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Reading</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dual-Attribute Theory</td>
<td>202-243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Dual-Attribute Theory versus Physicalism and Substance Dualism</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Nonorganismic Dual-Attribute Theories</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Epiphenomenalism</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>The Argument For Epiphenomenalism</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Do Qualia Exist?</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Dennett’s Argument Against Qualia</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Arguments Against Epiphenomenalism</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>Explaining Emergence: Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, Psychophysical Laws and Structure</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>Emergentism</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>Arguments For and Against Emergentism</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>Dual-Attribute Theory in Perspective</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Reading</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Idealism, Neutral Monism, and Mind–Body Pessimism</td>
<td>246-267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Varieties of Idealism</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>The Motivation and Argument For Ontological Idealism</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>Arguments Against Idealism</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>Neutral Monism</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>The Arguments For and Against Neutral Monism</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Mind–Body Pessimism</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Further Reading</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The Hylomorphic Worldview</td>
<td>269-275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>What Is Hylomorphism?</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>The Hylomorphic Worldview</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Organic Composition and Functional Analysis</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Contents

10.4 The Concept of Organization 280  
10.5 Hylomorphism and the Multilevel Worldview 285  
10.6 Hylomorphism versus Physicalism and Classic Emergentism 288  
10.7 Causal Pluralism 290  
10.8 The Argument For Hylomorphism 296  
Further Reading 304  

11 A Hylomorphic Theory of Mind 306  
Overview 306  
11.1 Patterns of Social and Environmental Interaction 309  
11.2 Rejecting Inner Minds 314  
11.3 Externalism 318  
11.4 Inner Experiences versus Sensorimotor Exploration 321  
11.5 Disjunctivism 324  
11.6 Direct Access, Pattern Recognition, and the Problem of Other Minds 331  
11.7 Psychological Language: Pattern Expression versus the Theory Model 334  
11.8 Hylomorphism versus Behaviorism 338  
11.9 Embodiment 339  
11.10 Hylomorphism and the Mental–Physical Dichotomy 343  
11.11 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Mental Causation 344  
11.12 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Psychophysical Emergence 352  
11.13 Arguments For and Against a Hylomorphic Theory of Mind 353  
Further Reading 355  

12 Persons [Available online at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski] 358  
13 Free Will [Available online at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski] 358  

Glossary 358  
References 389  
Acknowledgments 403  
Index 404
Philosophy of mind is one of the liveliest fields in contemporary philosophy – a hub of activity that intersects with metaphysics, ethics, epistemology, and the philosophies of science and language. The field is usefully divided into five areas of research: (1) mind and body, (2) consciousness, (3) mental representation, (4) the philosophy of psychology and neuroscience, and (5) action theory. This book introduces readers to these topics by focusing on mind-body problems and the range of theories that address them. It is more comprehensive than other available texts. Like other texts, it discusses familiar forms of substance dualism, physicalism, and dual-attribute theory, but it also covers theories off the beaten path such as neutral monism, idealism, and hylomorphism. It covers prominent arguments in the philosophical literature, but also arguments that typically receive short shrift such as Wittgenstein’s private language argument, and the embodied mind objection to functionalism. In addition, it discusses how recent developments in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science have impacted mind-body debates, a topic that often goes unaddressed.

The book is written in a nontechnical style aimed primarily at upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, and interested professionals, but I have frequently used parts of it to teach first-year students. Each chapter begins with an overview and ends with suggestions for further reading, so the book can easily be used by itself or in conjunction with primary sources. It includes a glossary, and many simple illustrations that are helpful for preparing chalkboards, overheads, and PowerPoint slides. Individual units are organized in a straightforward way that is designed to help readers jump into current debates: the problems, the theories, and the main arguments for and against each.

As a complement to the book, two chapters (12 and 13) are available free online at www.wiley.com/go/jaworski. These chapters cover persons and free will, since many professors like to include units on these topics in their philosophy of mind courses. The addition of these chapters makes the book a flexible teaching tool that is easy to use for introductory courses. Here is an example of what a syllabus for an introductory course based on the book might look like:
Preface

Wechs
Topics
Sections
Philosophy of Mind

1–2
Introduction to mind–body theories, mind–body problems, and basic concepts in philosophy of mind
1.1–1.6
2.1–2.5

3
Substance dualism
3.1
The argument for substance dualism
3.2
The problem of interaction
3.5

4
Physicalism
4.1–4.4
The argument for physicalism
4.5
The knowledge argument and qualia
4.7, 4.8

5
The identity theory
5.4
Lewis’s argument for the identity theory
5.6
The multiple-realizability argument
6.1

6
Functionalism
6.3
The liberalism objection
6.7
The Chinese room
6.8

7
Hylomorphism
10.1–10.6, 10.8, 11.1, 11.2

Philosophy of Persons

8–10
Animalism
12.1
Constitutionalism
12.2
Souls
12.3
Brains
12.4

Free Will and Determinism

11–14
The problem of free will and determinism
13.1–13.2
Compatibilism
13.3–13.6
Libertarianism
13.7
Hard determinism and hard incompatibilism
13.8

The book also makes an original contribution to the philosophical literature. It presents hylomorphism not as a mere historical curiosity, but as a theory whose central ideas dovetail with current work in biology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. The hylomorphic theory developed here bears many similarities to classic emergentism and forms of nonreductive physicalism, but it differs from these theories in important respects that insulate it from some of the standard objections to them.
Chapter 1
Mind–Body Theories and Mind–Body Problems

Overview

Mind–body theories and mind–body problems form the core subject-matter of philosophy of mind. Mind–body theories offer different ways of understanding how mental and physical phenomena are related. They are divided into two broad categories: monistic theories and dualistic theories. Monistic theories claim that there is fundamentally one kind of thing. Physical monism or physicalism, as it is usually called, claims that everything is physical; everything can be exhaustively described and explained by physics. Mental monism, which is typically called ‘idealism’, claims that everything is mental – everything can be exhaustively described and explained using our prescientific psychological concepts. Finally, neutral monism claims that everything is neutral; everything can be exhaustively described and explained using a conceptual framework that is neither mental nor physical but neutral.

Unlike monistic theories, dualistic theories deny that a single conceptual framework is sufficient to describe and explain everything. Rather, a complete description and explanation of everything requires that we use both the mental and the physical conceptual frameworks. There are, then, two fundamentally distinct kinds of properties individuals can have: mental properties, which are expressed by the predicates of the mental framework, and physical properties, which are expressed by the predicates of the physical framework. Among dualistic theories, dual-attribute theories claim that the very same individual can have both mental and physical properties. Substance dualistic theories deny this. The very same individual cannot have both mental properties and physical properties, they claim. According to substance dualists, mental beings such as you and I have no physical properties at all, and physical beings such as human bodies have no mental
properties. This implies that there are not only two fundamentally distinct kinds of properties, but also two fundamentally distinct kinds of individuals as well: those with exclusively mental properties, and those with exclusively physical properties.

In addition to the foregoing theories, there are three others that fall outside the main classification of monistic and dualistic theories. Instrumentalism falls outside the classification because it denies a realist understanding of psychological discourse. Mind–body pessimism falls outside the classification because it denies the possibility of giving a completely satisfactory account of how mental and physical phenomena are related, and hylomorphism falls outside the standard classification because it denies that human behavior can be described accurately in terms of a mental–physical distinction.

Mind–body problems have two features in common: the distinction between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and premises that make it difficult to understand how mental and physical phenomena are related. The problem of other minds is an example. It makes it difficult to understand how it is possible for us to know what other people are thinking or feeling based on our knowledge of their bodily behavior. The problem of psychophysical emergence, on the other hand, makes it difficult to see how it is possible for mental phenomena to exist at all if the world is fundamentally physical, and the problem of mental causation makes it difficult to see how mental and physical phenomena can interact in the ways they appear to.

1.1 Mind and Brain

The surgeon removed the section of skull and cut through the dura mater revealing the brain beneath. It pulsed gently in sync with the patient’s heartbeat. He was 12-year-old R. W. (name concealed for privacy). He’d had a difficult birth but had otherwise developed normally until the seizures began. Three years of failed treatments and months of tortured deliberation had brought him and his parents to this point. Doctors were going to remove part of his brain – in theory, the part responsible for his seizures. The difficulty was identifying exactly what part that was and removing it without damaging the surrounding tissue and with it R. W.’s ability to speak or laugh, to recognize faces or remember facts, to play the piano or smell cookies baking in the oven.

R. W. received a local anesthetic as they cut through his scalp, and was mildly sedated now, but was otherwise awake and alert. The lead surgeon began touching one section of brain tissue after another with two metal probes that carried an electric current. Based on R. W.’s symptoms he guessed this was where the seizures were originating. They always began the same way: an experience of colored
triangles – like the afterimages of bright lights only clearer. R. W. would then become confused about his surroundings, and see men moving toward him with guns. Those who saw R. W. during one of these episodes could hear the terror in his voice, and see it on his face as his eyes and head moved from right to left, following, it seemed, the movements of the men across the room.

As the surgeon now touched sections of R. W.’s brain he observed R. W.’s behavior carefully, and asked that R. W. describe any changes he experienced. After stimulating one area in particular R. W. said with astonishment, “Oh, gee, gosh, robbers are coming at me with guns!” A few moments later the stimulation was repeated, “Yes, the robbers, they are coming after me … Oh gosh! There they are, my brother is there. He is aiming an air rifle at me.” R. W.’s eyes moved slowly to the left … ¹

The foregoing story describes a real operation performed by the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (1891–1976). Penfield did pioneering work mapping functional areas of the brain using electrical stimulation in an effort to treat patients like R. W. He kept detailed records of his observations. Another of Penfield’s cases involved a 32-year-old woman, A. Bra., who began having seizures a year earlier. Penfield’s notes report the effects of stimulating various numbered areas of her right temporal lobe:

15. “I hear singing.”
15. Repeated. “Yes, it is White Christmas.” When asked if anyone was singing, she said, “Yes, a choir.” When asked if she remembered it being sung with a choir, she said she thought so.
16. “That is different, a voice – talking – a man.”
17. “Yes, I have heard it before. A man’s voice – talking.”
18. “There is the sound again – like a radio program – a man talking.” She said it was like a play, the same voice as before.
19. “The play again!” Then she began to hum. When asked what she was humming, she said she did not know, it was what she heard.
19. Repeated. Patient began to hum. She continued at the ordinary pace of a song.
   “I know it but I don’t know the name – I have heard it before. I hear it, it is an instrument – just one.” She thought it was a violin.
26. Patient said, “It hurts.” Stimulation was stopped. She said, “I see a picture.” She added, “It was a face which comes from a picture.”
27. “The same thing. The play and they are banging on something like a drum.”
28. “I see people walking.” ²

The effects Penfield produced are familiar to students of neuroscience. Electrical stimulation of the cortex can cause patients to move their limbs, to sense numbness or tingling on the skin, to experience flashes of light or buzzing sensations, to feel fear, experience déjà vu, or have a sense that they are in a dream. ³ It can also inhibit functioning: in a dramatic demonstration reported on the front page